RADIO AND TELEVISION-RIGHT To REASONABLE BROADCAST TIME MAY MEAN UNEQUAL TIME FOR FEDERAL POLITICAL CANDIDATES-CBS v. FCC, 101 S. Ct. 2813 (1981).

Thirteen months before the 1980 presidential election, Gerald M.
Rafshoon, acting for the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee,
asked the national television networks to make available thirty minutes of programming time in early December of 1979.' The Committee's stated purpose was to announce President Carter's candidacy for
re-election and to present a documentary highlighting his administration's achievements. 2 The American Broadcasting Company (ABC)
advised the Committee "that it had not yet decided when it would
begin selling political time" and accordingly did not grant the Committee's request.' The National Broadcasting Company (NBC) was
similarly unprepared to offer political time so early in the campaign
process. 4 It concluded, as did the Columbia Broadcasting System
(CBS), that potential equal time requests 5 of the numerous Republican and Democratic presidential candidates would be too disruptive
of its regular programming to permit accommodation of the Committee's specific request. 6 Unlike the other networks, CBS did offer to
sell two five-minute segments of non-prime time.7
The Committee immediately filed a complaint with the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) under section 312(a)(7) of the

CBS v. FCC, 101 S.Ct. 2813, 2817-18 (1981). The Committee requested that the time be
provided on December 4, 5, 6, or 7 between the hours of 8:00 p.m. and 10:30 p.m.
2 Id. at 2818.
3 Id. & n.3. ABC later notified the Committee that it would begin sales of campaign time in
January, 1980. Id. at 2818.
4 Id. at 2818-19.
5 A political candidate has a statutory right to request access after a broadcaster has
permitted his opponent to use its station. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976). The applicable statute,
commonly referred to as the "'equaltime provision," in part states: "Ifany licensee shall permit
any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting
station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of
such broadcasting station .. ."I d.
6 CBS v. FCC, 101 S. Ct. 2813, 2818-19 (1981). The ABC network also expressed concern
about the equal time problem in a letter to the Carter-Mondale Committee. Id. at 2840.
According to CBS, at the time of the Committee's request in October, 1979, three Democrats
and eleven Republicans had announced, or were expected to announce, their candidacies for the
highest federal political office. Id. at 2818 n.2 (citing Letter from Raymond E. Dillon, Director
of Political Sales at CBS, to Gerald M. Rafshoon (Oct. 17, 1979)). ABC maintained that two
Democrats and nine Republicans had announced their candidacies and a tenth Republican was
also expected to declare his candidacy. Id. at 2840.
7 Id. at 2818. In its letter, CBS also noted that the same counter offer had been made to two
Republican candidates who previously requested half-hour programs. Id. at 2818 n.2.
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Communications Act of 1934,8 seeking review of the networks' refusals to provide "reasonable access."
This section authorizes the
FCC to revoke a broadcaster's license "for willful or repeated failure

to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase of reasonable
amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally
qualified candidate for federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy."' 0 In a four to three decision, the Commission ruled that the
networks had failed to meet their section 312(a)(7) obligations"1 because their reasons for refusing access 12 were " 'deficient' under its
standard of reasonableness."' 3 The broadcasters were ordered to
inform the FCC as to how they would comply with the statutory

Pub. L. No. 92-22-5, § 103(2)(A), 86 Stat. 4 (1972) (amending the Federal Communication
Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064)(codified at 47 U. S. C. § 312(a)(7) (1976)).
" CBS v. FCC, 101 S. Ct. 2813, 2819 (1981). The FCC had previously found broadcasters
in violation of section 312(a)(7) for denying presidential candidates access to their stations. E.g.,
Kennedy for Presidential Comm. v. Boston Broadcasters, 80 F.C.C.2d 93 (1980) (refusal to sell
half-hour of prime time unreasonable); Campaign "76 Media Communications v. WGN, 58
F.C.C.2d 1142 (1976) (refusal to sell President Ford Committee any time segment less than five
minutes unreasonable). Contra In re WALB-TV, 59 F.C.C.2d 1246 (1976) (broadcaster retraction of agreement to transmit five-hour fund raising telethon not unreasonable). With respect to
congressional candidates, the FCC has found broadcaster conduct consistent with section
312(a)(7) when counter-offers were made. E.g., Riegle v. WKZO-TV, 59 F.C.C.2d 1314 (1976)
(counter-offer of five minutes in fringe time instead of prime time reasonable); In re Don Smith,
49 F.C.C.2d 678 (1974) (counter-offer of half-hour in fringe time instead of prime time reasonable).
" 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1976).
I Carter-Mondale Presidential Comm. v. ABC, 74 F.C.C.2d 631, aff'd on rehearing, 74
F.C.C.2d 657 (1979), aff'd sub nora. CBS v. FCC, 629 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1980), aff'd, 101 S. Ct.
2813 (1981). In his dissenting opinion, justice Stevens noted the political split in the vote-those
Commissioners voting that the networks had violated section 312(a)(7) were Democrats and
those voting to the contrary were Republicans. CBS v. FCC, 101 S. Ct. 2813, 2841 (1981)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
The Federal Communications Commission is composed of seven members who are appointed by the President, 47 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1976), for a seven year term. Id. § 154(c). The
provision specifically stipulates that "[n]ot more than four members of the Commission shall be
members of the same political party." Id. § 154(b).
1 Carter-Mondale Presidential Comm. v. ABC, 74 F.C.C.2d 631, 649, aJfd on rehearing,
74 F.C.C.2d 657 (1979), affdsub nom. CBS v. FCC, 629 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1980), aff'd, 101 S.
Ct. 2813 (1981). NBC defended its refusal to sell time on the ground that the campaign was, at
the time of the request, being conducted on a state-by-state basis. Id. at 645. It argued that over
one hundred individuals were seeking the presidential nomination who might also make requests. Id. at 647, and that the disruptive impact of those potential political broadcasts upon
regular programming justified its response. Id. at 648.
I3 101 S.Ct. 2813, 2819 (1981). In evaluating a broadcaster's response to access requests, the
Commission focuses upon the particular needs of the candidate. It also considers "the number of
candidates, and the availability of classes of time." Carter-Mondale Presidential Comm VARC,
74 F.C.C.2d 631, 642, aff'd on rehearing, 74 F.C.C.2d 659 (1979), aff'd sub nor. CBS v.
F.C.C., 629 F.2d I (D.C.Cir. 1980), aff'd, 101 S. Ct. 2813 (1981).
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The Commission reconsidered its decision, but ulti-

mately maintained its prior position.

5

The networks appealed the Commission's order to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.' 6 Affirming the
FCC's decision, the court of appeals announced that section 312(a)(7)
"created a new, affirmative right of access to the broadcast media for
individual candidates for federal elective office."' 7 The Supreme
Court of the United States granted certiorari to determine whether the
14

Id. at 651.

's Carter-Mondale Presidential Comm. v. ABC, 74 F.C.C.2d 657, 671 (1979), affd

stib

nom. CBS v. FCC, 629 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1980), aJJd, 101 S. Ct. 2813 (1981). The FCC
rejected the networks' contention that section 312(a)(7) merely codified existing practice, and its
argument that the Commission's actions amounted to an improper substitution of its judgment
for the discretion previously reserved to the broadcaster. Id. at 662, 665.
"' CBS v. FCC, 101 S. Ct. 2813, 2819 (1981) (appeal taken pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 402
(1976)).
'7 CBS v. FCC, 101 S. Ct. at 2819 (1981). In addition, the court of appeals found that the
Commission had the authority to decide when the statutory right to access attached, objectively
determining the date on which the campaign had begun. CBS v. FCC, 629 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir.
1980), afJ'd, 101 S. Ct. 2813 (1981).
The court noted that broadcasters must consider the following factors when responding to a
candidate's request:
(a) the individual needs of the candidate (as expressed by the candidate); (b) the
amount of time previously provided to the candidate; (c) potential disruption of
regular programming; (d) the number of other candidates likely to invoke equal
opportunity rights if the broadcaster grants the request before him: and (e) the
timing of the request.
Id. at 19. When access complaints are brought before the FCC, it will limit its review to examine
only whether the broadcaster used the proper standard and whether its explanation is reasonable. Id. at 18. Reviewing the FCC's application of section 312(a)(7) to the Carter-Mondale case.
the court of appeals concluded that the FCC correctly found that the networks' adoption of
blanket access policies and failure to address the specific needs of the Carter-Mondale Committee
constitdted a violation of the reasonable access provision. Id. at 22. With respect to the networks'
allegations of a first amendment violation, the court found that the FCC's interpretation of
section 312(a)(7) was "a constitutionally acceptable accommodation between, on the one hand,
the public's right to be informed about elections and the right of candidates to speak and, on the
other hand, the editorial rights of broadcasters." id. at 25. In a concurring opinion, Judge Tamm
added that the statutory construction was constitutionally firm only if the FCC 'maintain[ed] a
very limited 'overseer' role consistent with its obligation of careful neutrality." Id. at 34 (Tamm,

J., concurring).
The court of appeals also addressed the issue of mootness. Id. at 27. The Committee, after
requesting broadcast time, decided to postpone the date of programming from January until
December because of the seizure of the American Embassy in Iran. CBS v. FCC, 101 S. Ct.
2813, 2819 (1981). All the parties in the suit agreed that the issue presented in this case was not
moot because it fell under the standard of "'capable of repetition, yet evading review.' " 629
F.2d at 28 (citing Southern Pacific Terminal v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498,515 (1911)). Since this was an
exigent situation and there was a reasonable expectation that the parties would be confronted
with the problem again, it was concluded that the issue was not moot and should be litigated.
629 F.2d at 28; see Gannet Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 377 (1979); Weinstein v. Bradford,
423 U.S. 147, 189 (1975). As a result of the hostage crisis, the Committee chose to contract for air
time with ABC and CBS in January of 1980. 101 S. Ct. at 2813, 2819.
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FCC had correctly interpreted and applied this reasonable access
provision.' 8
In an opinion echoing both the language and reasoning of the
court of appeals, the Supreme Court in CBS v. FCC 9 held that
section 312(a)(7) created an affirmative right of access to the broadcast media for federal political candidates. 20 According to the Court,
the FCC's decision that "it will independently determine whether a
campaign has begun" and when section 312(a)(7) obligations have
attached was within the Commission's authority to implement the
statute.2 ' Moreover, the FCC's requirement that broadcasters consider access requests "on an individualized basis" was deemed appropriate in light of the statute's mandate of reasonable access to individual candidates. 22 After reviewing the FCC's application of section
312(a)(7) to the networks, the Court concluded that the Commission
had not "abus[ed] its discretion in finding that the [networks] failed to
grant the 'reasonable access' required by [section] 312(a)(7). ' ' 23 The
Supreme Court rejected the networks's allegation of a first amendment violation and found that the Commission's interpretation of
section 312(a)(7) appropriately balanced the free speech rights of the
24
interested parties and the public.
"Although broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by a First
Amendment interest," 25 there is no "unabridgeable First Amendment
right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to
speak, write or publish." 26 The limited number of broadcast frequencies coupled with the unlimited number of individuals desiring to
use them has required the federal government to regulate the broadcasting industry. 27 The public retains, however, its "collective right
'

CBS v. FCC, 449 U.S. 950 (1980).

1101 S. Ct. 2813 (1981).

"- Id. at 2825.
2_ Id. at 2826.
--

4

Id. at 2826-27 (emhasis in original).
Ild. at 2829.

Id. at 2830.

Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969).
"' Id. at 388. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the broadcasting industry "'has received
thc most limited First Amendment protection" in FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748
(1978). Compare Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (Florida statute
requiring newspapers to provide personally attacked political candidates with equal space in
which to respond held violative of the first amendment) with Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC. 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (FCC regulations vesting candidates with right to respond where
opponent was subject of political editorial held constitutionally firm).
. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 779 (1978): NBC v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-18 (1943); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470,
474 (1940). In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), Justice White discussed
the justification for regulating the broadcasting industry and the history of such regulation. He
explained that:
-
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to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes
of the First Amendment." 2 8 Therefore, even though the government

may place restrictions on broadcasters "in favor of others whose views
is consistshould be expressed," 2 9 it must regulate in a manner which
30
speech.
free
of
guarantee
amendment
ent with the first
Before section 312(a)(7) was enacted, three rules of communications law governed broadcasters' coverage of political news and political candidates' access to the media: the public interest doctrine, the
equal time right, and the fairness doctrine. 3' These rules are part of a
comprehensive statutory scheme of regulations set forth in the Com33
munications Act, 32 and implemented and enforced by the FCC.
The public interest doctrine, embodied in section 309 of the
Act, 34 authorizes the FCC to grant broadcasting licenses to those who
will operate in the public interest. 35 In the absence of a statutory
[W]here there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there
are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgable First Amendment right
to broadcast. . . .It would be strange if the First Amendment, aimed at protecting
and furthering communications, prevented the Government from making radio
communications possible by requiring licenses to broadcast and by limiting the
number of licenses so as not to overcrowd the spectrum.
Id. at 388-89; cj. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 159-60 (1972) (Douglas. J..
dissenting) (refuting scarcity justification for governmental regulation).
"I Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).

29 Id.
30 Id.
3 See Note, The Right of "'Reasonable Access" for Federal Political Candidatev Under

Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act, 78 COLUM L. REv. 1287. 1287-88 (1978). There.
the author contended that because the public interest doctrine, the equal time right. and the
fairness doctrine were ineffective in enforcing access claims against licensees, Congress enacted
section 312(a)(7). Id. at 1288.
12 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified in 15. 47 U.S.C.). The
provisions regulating the broadcasting industry are codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976).
33 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). Congress created the FCC to regulate interstate and foreign wire
and radio communications "so as to make available . .. a rapid, efficient nation-wide and
world-wide wire and radio communications service." Id. The Commission is vested with the
power to "make such rules and regulations,. . . as may be necessary" to effectuate the purpose of
the Communications Act. id. § 154(i). A similar rulemaking power is delegated to the Commission. Id. § 303(r).
34Id. § 309.
35 Id. § 309(a). The responsibility of determining whether broadcasters meet the public
interest standard and the authority to make regulations to that end has been delegated by
Congress to the FCC. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775. 802,
810 (1978) (affirming FCC regulation requiring diversification of newspaper-broadcast combinations). There is some variance, however, concerning who has standing to vindicate public
interest. Compare Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC. 359 F.2d 994,
1001 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (permitting private citizens alleging that station's racially discriminator%
programming failed to meet public interest standard to intervene in license renewal proceedings)
with FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 101 S. Ct. 1266, 1279 (1981) (finding FCC's policy of
relying on market forces to diversify entertainment programming rather than review of licensee's
entertainment format changes during license renewal proceedings as demanded by private
individuals consistent with Communications Act).
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definition of "public interest," the FCC has developed a standard
requiring broadcasters to devote a reasonable amount of time "to the

consideration and discussion of public issues of interest in the community served by the particular station." 36 More specifically, the public
37
interest standard includes an obligation to broadcast political news,
to permit any particular political
but a broadcaster is not required
38
station.
its
use
to
candidate
Under the equal time provision, section 315(a), 3 9 once a broadcaster has allowed one political candidate to use its station, it must

afford the candidate's opponents an equal opportunity to do so. 40 This
section applies only to a candidate's personal appearance on a station 41 and specifically exempts bona fide newscasts, interviews, and
documentaries. 42 Thus, a political candidate's claim of a right of

3 Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949) [hereinafter
cited as Report on Editorializing]. Matters of public interest include "social, political, [and]
esthetic .. . ideas and experiences." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969).
" Report on Commission Policy in Enforcing Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act,
68 F.C.C.2d 1079, 1087-88 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Report on Enforcing Section 312(a)(7)];
Commission En banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C.2d 2303, 2314 (1960) (setting forth
political broadcasting as one of fourteen essential elements of public interest standard).
" Report on Enforcing Section 312(a)(7), .slpranote 37, at 1088. The FCC, in its Report on
the Use of Broadcast and Cablecast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office, 34 F.C.C.2d 510
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Report on Use of Facilties], states that: "The licensee in its own goodfaith judgment in serving the public interest may determine which political races are of greatest
interest and significance to its service area, and therefore may refuse to sell time to candidates for
less important offices, provided it treats all candidates for such offices equally." Id. at 535.
Although the public interest standard does not require broadcasters to afford a particular
candidate with broadcast time there is case law which suggests that denial of access to all
candidates would contravene the public interest. See Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY,
Inc., 360 U.S. 52.5, 534 (1959); In re Homer P. Rainey, 11 F.C.C.2d 898 (1947); State v.
University of Maine, 266 A.2d 86 (hie. 1970).
" 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976). For the text of section 315(a), see note 5 supra.
" Once a station has granted a candidate use of its broadcasting facility the statutory
obligation to provide his opponents with equal time attaches with mathematical certainty.
Kennedy for President Comm. v. FCC, 636 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Brandywine-Maine Line
Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973). The
courts have found the purpose of equal time provision to be the prevention of discrimination
betveen candidates by requiring the broadcaster to treat all candidates for a particular office in
a similar manner. See Flory v. FCC, 528 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1975); Paulsen v. FCC, 491 F.2d
887, 892 (9th Cir. 1974) (applying equal time provision to entertainment appearances by
political candidate and comedian Pat Paulsen in order to prevent "unequal use of the broadcast
media").
"' Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, 186 F.2d 1, 2-3 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 909 (1951).
4 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1)-(4) (1976). In addition, the FCC has promulgated a rule requiring
candidates to make equal time demands within one week from the original use. 47 C.F.R. §
73.1940(e) (1980). For a discussion of how the seven-day rule operates, see New Primer on
Political Broadcasting & Cablecasting, 69 F.C.C.2d 2209, 2223-24 (1978).
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access under section 315(a) is contingent upon an opponent's prior
use.

43

The fairness doctrine, which evolved from the general obligation
to operate in the public interest, 44 imposes a twofold duty on broadcasters to cover controversial issues and to present differing viewpoints

on those issues. 45 Licensees are permitted to exercise significant discretion in selecting the program material and in deciding how to best

present the differing views. 46

The doctrine received statutory ap-

proval in 1959 when section 315(a) was amended to require broadcasting licensees to "afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion
' 47
of conflicting views on issues of public importance.
Two Supreme Court cases, Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC,4
and CBS v. Democratic National Committee,49 dealt specifically with
the individual's right to access. Red Lion considered both the rights of
a private individual who is personally attacked on an issue of public
importance 5 and the rights of a political candidate who becomes the
subject of a political editorial. 51 Democratic National Committee
43 See generally Note, supra note 31, at 1287-88.

41 Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine on the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public
Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10,415, 10,425 (1964). For a thorough examination of the development of the fairness doctrine, see generally Barrow, The Equal Opportunities and Fairness
Doctrines in Broadcasting: Pillars in the Forum of Democracy, 37 U. CiN. L. Rev. 447 (1968).
"- Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369 (1969). See also NBC v. FCC. 516
F.2d 1101, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Brandywvine-Maine Line Radio v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 38-46
(D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 992 (1973).
46 Report on Editorializing, supra note 36, at 1247. This report recognizes that it is the
broadcaster who is to decide "whether [a] subject is worth considering, whether the viewpoint
. . . has already received a sufficient amount of broadcast time, or whether there may not be
other available groups or individuals who might be more appropriate spokesmen.- Id. at 1251.
See also Straus Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1001, 1008-09 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (finding
it within licensee's discretion to determine whether matter is governed by fairness doctrine and
refusing to overturn broadcaster's determination unless unreasonable and in bad faith).
17 Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, 73 Stat. 557 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)).
48 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
49 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
"' 395 U.S. at 371. The Red Lion Broadcasting Company aired a program in which Reverend Billy Hargis stated that a certain individual was a communist. Id. Fred Cook, the individual
in question, demanded that the broadcasting company permit him to respond to the personal
attack. Id. After hearing Cook's complaint, the FCC ruled that he was entitled to respond to the
attack under the fairness doctrine. Id. at 372. The FCC's ruling was affirmed by the court of
appeals. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The Red Lion
station then brought the case before the Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari.
51 Subsequent to the Red Lion controversy, but before the case was heard by the Supreme
Court, the FCC promulgated rules concerning personal attacks and political editorials. See 47
C.F.R. §§ 73.1920-.1921 (1980). The rules were formulated in an effort to objectify and make
more easily enforceable the obligations of broadcasters under the fairness doctrine. 395 U.S. at
373-74. The rules were found unconstituitonal as violative of free speech in RTNDA v. FCC, 400
F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1968), rev'd sub nom. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969).
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examined the rights of private individuals who seek broadcast52 time to
advocate the views of groups with which they are affiliated.

In Red Lion, the Supreme Court read the fairness doctrine and
the equal time provision together to sanction a contingent right of
access for the private individual when personally attacked and for the
candidate when made the subject of a political editorial during a
broadcast. 5 3 The FCC had promulgated rules which created for
individuals a right to respond in such situations.5 4 Red Lion Broadcasting Company attacked these regulations as an abridgment of its
first amendment rights. 55 Summarily dismissing the constitutional
challenge,5 0 the Court found the regulations to be constitutionally
indistinguishable from the section 315(a) right to equal time created

by Congress. 57 It reasoned that the FCC could "employ a similar
device ' 58 where personal attacks against private individuals and political editorials concerning candidates were broadcast by a radio or
television station.59 In finding the regulations constitutionally sound,
Red Lion recognized the private individual's contingent right to
broadcasting time.60

12 412 U.S. at 97. Two parties were joined as petitioners before the Supreme Court in the
case: the Democratic National Committee and Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace. Id.
at 97-98. The Democratic National Committee had previously sought a declaratory ruling from
the FCC alleging that broadcasters' policies of refusing to sell time to responsible entities was
violative of the first amendment. Id. at 98. The Committee intended to purchase time to
"present the views of the Democratic Party and to solicit funds," but anticipated difficulty in
obtaining broadcast time based upon its past experiences. Id. at 98-99. The Business Executives
Move for Vietnam Peace filed a complaint against a particular radio station that refused to sell
the organization one minute segments in which to present its views on the Vietnam War. Id. at
98. The FCC rejected the organizations' claim of a right to purchase editorial advertising time.
In re Democratic Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (1971), rev'd sub nom. CBS v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); In re Democratic Nat'l Comm., 25 F.C.C.2d 216
(1970), rev'd sub nom. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm'n., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); In re Complaint
by Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d 242 (1970), reo'd sub nora.
Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (1971), rev'd sub nom. CBS
v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
13395 U.S. at 385, 391.
4 Id. at 373; -see note 51 supra.
5 367 U.S. at 386. The broadcasters contended "that the First Amendment protects their
desire to use their allotted frequencies continuously to broadcast whatever they choose, and to
exclude whomever they choose from ever using that frequency." Id.
I at 375.
Id.
Id. at 391. Comparing the FCC's response regulations to the specific provision passed by
Congress for equal time under section 315(a), the Court reasoned that they were constitutionally
the same. Id. It then noted that the equal time provision had survived constitutional scrutiny in
Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 52.5 (1959). 367 U.S. at 375.
• 367 U.S. at 385.

Id.
I9
6I

Id. at 378, 382.
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Relying on Red Lion as "establishing a limited constitutional

right of access to the air waves," 6' the plaintiffs in Democratic National Committee alleged that a broadcaster's policy of refusing to sell
editorial advertisement time to responsible entities who wanted to
present their views on public issues62 violated the first amendment and
the Communications Act.6 3 Reversing the court of appeals' directive
that the FCC devise a plan for the limited sale of editorial announcements,6 4 the Supreme Court held that licensees are not required to sell

individuals time for such a purpose.65 The question, according to the
Court, was not whether controversial issues should be broadcast, but
rather who should decide "what issues are to be discussed by whom,
and when. 6 The power to make that decision was found to be
vested in the licensee.6 7 The Supreme Court reasoned that a judicially imposed requirement on the FCC to develop a scheme for
limited sale of editorial time would seriously impair the licensees
traditional journalistic discretion, transfer the accountability of li-

censees to individuals, 68 and come dangerously close to governmental
regulation of content. 69 Therefore, the Court permitted the broad70
caster's editorial discretion to prevail.
1 DemocraticNat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 99. The petitioner, Democratic National Commit-

tee, did not succeed with this argument before the Commission.
62 Id. at 98; see note 52 supra.
63 412 U.S. at 97.
6 Id. The court of appeals had remanded both cases to the FCC, requiring it to -develop
procedures and guidelines for administering a First Amendment right of access.'" Id.; Business
Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (1971), rev'd sub nom. CBS v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
s 412 U.S. at 132.
Id. at 130.
IId. at 117-18. The licensees' discretionary role was described by the Court as being an
essential part of the balance which had to be maintained in the regulatory scheme to preserve the
first amendment rights of all parties. In an oft-cited passage, the Court explained the balancing
principle:
[T]he Commission acts in essence as an 'overseer' but the initial and primary responsibility for fairness, balance, and objectivity rests with the licensee. This role of the
Government as an 'overseer' and ultimate arbiter and guardian of the public interest
and the role of the licensee as a journalistic 'free agent' call for a delicate balancing of
competing interests. The maintenance of this balance for more than 40 years has
called on both the regulators and the licensees to walk a 'tightrope' to preserve the
First Amendment values written into the Radio Act and its successor, the Communications Act.
Id. at 117.
8 Id. at 124-25. The Court noted that the licensee is accountable to the public to perform in
the public interest whereas the individual has no such duty. Id. at 124. Moreover, both Congress
and the Commission agree that it is advantageous for the journalistic role to be -concentrated in
the licensee rather than diffused among many," because the licensee can be held accountable if
the public's needs are not served. Id. at 125.
89 Id. at 126. The Court explained that a mandatory scheme of access would require the
Commission "to oversee far more of the day-to-day operations of broadcasters' conduct," which
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The foregoing scheme of access controlled the candidate's ability
to obtain broadcast time until Congress enacted the Federal Election
Campaign Act? 1 It did so because it perceived a need to purify the
federal electoral process? 2 Section 312(a)(7) was enacted as part of
the Campaign Communications Reform Act? 3 Although there is
little evidence of the intended impact of section 312(a)(7), 74 the reasonable access provision, the purpose of the Campaign Communications Reform Act as set forth in the legislative history 75 is to afford
candidates greater access to the media in order to obtain a better
informed electorate, and to decrease the expense of political cam0
paigns.

7

In CBS v. FCC, the Supreme Court considered whether Congress
intended section 312(a) (7) to create "an affirmative promptly enforceable right of reasonable access" 77 to the broadcast media or whether
the provision "merely codified prior policies developed by the . . .
Commission under the public interest standard." 78 Writing for the
would result in a "case-by-case determination [by the Commission] of who should be heard and
when." Id. at 127.
IId. at 131.
7! Pub. L. No. 92-22.5, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
7'See S. REP. No. 96, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPoITr].
This committee report indicates that the purpose of the legislation is "to promote fair practices in
the conduct of election campaigns for Federal political offices," and "to preserve the purity of
Federal elections by limiting spending." Id. at 31. Senator Muskde recommended that the legislation be enacted to ensure "that every candidate has a chance to speak to the voters and that no
candidate gets too many chances." 117 CONC. REC. 29,321 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
The Act is a comprehensive piece of legislation dealing with numerous aspects of federal
elections. The thrust of the separate titles is as follows: Title I deals principally with media rates
to be charged just prior to elections. Campaign Communications Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 9222.5, 86 Stat. 3 (1972). Title II is composed of amendments to the criminal code. Id. at 8. Title III
requires the disclosure of campaign funds. Id. at 11. Title IV deals with campaign funding. Id.
at 19.
" Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 103(2)(A), 86 Stat. 4 (1972) (amending the Federal Communication
Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1976)).
14 For example, while discussing S. 382, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), the proposed bill
eventually enacted into law, Senator Pastore, a chief proponent of the legislation, stated that
there was "nothing in the law" compelling broadcasters to sell candidates any time. 117 CONe.
REc. 29,028 (1971) (statement of Sen. Pastore). WVhen reminded that the bill contained a
provision requiring broadcasters to sell time, the Senator responded that, even so, candidates
could not inundate the broadcasters with requests. Id. Indeed, since its enactment, members of
Congress and the FCC have demonstrated their confusion on the meaning and impact of section
312(a)(7). See Repeal of "Equal Time" Requirements: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 41-43
(1980) (remarks of Robert Bruce, General Counsel to FCC). Prior to the CBS v. FCC decision,
the Supreme Court characterized section 312(a)(7) as a codification of broadcasters' duties under
the public interest doctrine. See DemocraticNat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 113 n.12.
" See SENATE REPom', supra note 72, at 1.
16 Id. at 20.
7 101 S. Ct. at 2820.

78 Id.
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majority, 79 Chief Justice Burger upheld the FCC's construction of the
statute, finding that section 312(a)(7) "create[d] a limited right to
'reasonable' access" for federal political candidates. 0 In coming to
this conclusion, the Court considered the statute's language, its legislative history, and the FCC's construction of the provision.
The language of section 312(a)(7) requires broadcasters to either
sell or give federal political candidates reasonable amounts of time or
risk license revocation. 81 Chief Justice Burger found this provision
unambiguous 2 Congress did not intend to reiterate the broadcasters
public interest duty to present political programming; rather, it
drafted section 312(a)(7) with an eye toward the " 'legally qualified
candidate' "83 seeking time to advance "his candidacy," 84 and provided a severe penalty8 5 to assure him "reasonable access." 86 In
addition, the reasonable access provision mandated a duty to political
candidates that was different from the limited public interest standard, 87 which required broadcasters to make good faith determinations
as to whether candidates should receive time 88 without guaranteeing
any individual candidate a "personal right of access." 89 It "single[d]
out legally qualified candidates for federal elective office and
grant[ed] them a special right of access on an individual basis."9 0
Thus, the Chief Justice found it an inescapable conclusion that section
312(a)(7) was more than a codification of the public interest standard. 91
Turning to the legislative history of the Federal Election Campaign Act, the Supreme Court noted that a primary purpose was to
increase political candidates' access to the media. 2 Failing to find any
79Joining in the majority opinion were Justices Brennan, Stewart, Blackmun, Marshall and
Powell. Id. at 2817.
8 Id. at 2830 (emphasis in original).
81 Id. at 2821. See text accompanying note 10 supra for the language of the provision.
82 101 S. Ct. at 2821.
93 Id.
91 Id. (emphasis in original).
85 Id. A single willful denial of a reasonable amount of broadcast time could, in the Court's
view, result in license revocation. Id. Furthermore, no showing of willfulness was required to
revoke a license if the denial was repeated. Id.
8I /d.

IId.
Id. (citing Report on Enforcing Section 312(a)(7), supra note 37, at 1087-88); see note 38
supra for a description of the public interest standard.
89 101 S. Ct. at 2821.
90 Id. (emphasis in original).
91 Id.
02 Id. at 2822; see SENATE RErynT, supra note 72, at 20. Additionally, the Court observed
that all three bills concerning campaign reform (S.1, 92d Cong., IstSess. (1971); S. 956, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); and S.382, supra note 74) had the primary objection of "increas[ing] a
candidate's accessibility to the media and reduc[ing] the level of spending for its use." 101 S. Ct.
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explanation of section 312(a)(7) or its intended impact in the legislative history, 93 the majority decided nonetheless that the obligations
imposed by that section differed from the public interest standard
based upon the separate treatment of the two provisions in a Senate
Commerce Committee Report. 4 After noting that the Conference

Committee had narrowed the Senate's proposal to federal candi-

dates, 95 and that floor debate in the House had drawn attention to
"the substantial impact [section] 312(a)(7) would have on the broadcasting industry,"96 the Court concluded that "[s]uch emphasis on the
thrust of the statute would seem unnecessary if it did nothing more
97
than reiterate the public interest standard.
"[T]he most telling evidence of congressional intent" was found
in the conforming amendment of section 315(a).98 That section previ-

ously provided that no obligation was imposed upon the broadcaster
to permit a candidate to use its station, but was amended to read that
no obligation was imposed "under this subsection."9 9 According to
the majority, this change represented a retreat from Congress's prior
position that there was no duty to allow access under section 315(a)
"presumably because section 312(a)(7) compel[led] such access" for
federal candidates.100 Had the provision simply been a codification of
the public interest standard supplemented with a license revocation
penalty, the conforming amendment would have been unnecessary. 10 1 Therefore, the Court found that the legislative history supported an affirmative right of reasonable access for individual federal

at 2821 (quoting Hearings on S.1, S.382, and S.956 before the Subcomm. on Communications of
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Pastore)).
93 101 S. Ct. at 2822. The Court relied principally on SENATE RE'ron, supra note 72, at 20.
See also note 74 supra. and accompanying text.
91 101 S. Ct. at 2822 (citing SENATE REorr, supra note 72).
9I Id. Although the provision initially introduced by the Senate applied to all candidates, it
was subsequently confined to federal candidates. S. CONF. RaP. No. 580, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 22
(1971); H. CONF. RE'. No. 752, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1971).
96 101 S. Ct. at 2822. The Court observed that a comment made during floor debates
brought attention to the fact that a broadcaster found in violation of the provision "'could lose
his license and be thrown out of business, his total record of public service notwithstanding.'" Id.
(quoting 118 CONe. REc. 326 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Keith)).
97 Id.
91 Id. The Court maintained that the enactment of section 312(a)(7) "necessitated" the
conforming amendment. Id.
Id. at 2822-23 (emphasis in original). Before amendment, the provision read "no obligation is imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate." 47
U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970) (amended 1976). As a result of the conforming amendment, section
315(a) now states "no obligation is imposed under this subsection upon any licensee to allow
the use of its station by any such candidate." Id. § 315(a) (1976). See notes 178-79 infra and
accompanying text for the dissent's position on the conforming amendment.
'0 101 S. Ct. at 2823.

101 Id.
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candidates, regardless of whether an opponent had previously ob02
tained access.1
The majority prefaced its examination of the FCC's explanation
of section 312(a)(7) by stating that if an agency is charged with the
execution of a statute, a court should uphold the agency's interpretation unless there are compelling indications that it wrongly construed
the provision, 0 3 especially where Congress has not acted to change the
agency's definition. 10 4 Turning to the FCC's interpretation of the
reasonable access provision, the majority found that the Commission
had consistently construed the provision as "extending beyond the
prior public interest policy."' 0 5 Since Congress was aware of the
agency's construction 0 8 and did not act to alter it, the Court determined that the FCC had interpreted the statute in accordance with
07
congressional intent.1

Chief Justice Burger next reviewed the manner in which the FCC
implemented section 312(a)(7). He noted that Congress had given no
guidance concerning the implementation of the provision, but had
adopted a "rule of reason,"'18 entrusting the Commission with the
duty to develop standards and enforce the provision through its rulemaking power. 0 9 The Chief Justice observed that the standards,
though not stated in formalized rules," 0 were evident in the FCC's
Id.
1*1Id.; see Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 381.
'0o101 S. Ct. at 2823; see United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 (1979); Zemel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11 (1965).
1O 101 S. Ct. at 2823. The majority noted that in 1972 the agency advised broadcasters of
"'the additionalspecific requirement"' to provide federal candidates with reasonable access and
to permit the purchase of reasonable amounts of time. Id. at 2823 (quoting Report on Use of
Facilities, supra note 38, at 537-38) (emphasis added). In addition, the FCC indicated subsequently that section 312(a)(7) was more than a codification of the public interest standard. Id.,
see Report on Enforcing Section 312(a)(7), supra note 37, at 1088.
'0
101 S.Ct. at 2823-24. The Court noted that Congress was apprised of the operative effect
of section 312(a)(7) during congressional hearings. Id.; see Hearings on S.372 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 136-38
(1973).
107 101 S. Ct. at 2825. In addition to the analysis of the agency's construction of section
312(a)(7), the Court commented upon its own previous interpretation of this provision. In
Democratic Nat') Comm., the Court took the position that the provision was essentially a
codification of the broadcasters' duty under section 315(a) to provide candidates with broadcast
time. 412 U.S. at 113 n.12. The CBS v. FCC Court characterized that comment as a "'qualified
observation," and explained that the "precise contours of the responsibilities created by (s]ection
312(a)(7)" were not at issue in DemocraticNat'l Comm. 101 S. Ct. at 2825.
10 101 S. Ct. at 2825.
lo Id.; see note 33 supra and accompanying text regarding the Commission's rulemaking
authority.
110101 S. Ct. at 2825. When the Commission inquired of broadcasters whether it should
promulgate regulations "to clarify licensee obligations under section 312(a)(7)," the broadcasters
objected. Id. at 2827 n.13. Therefore, the Court concluded that the broadcasters and the
Commission were jointly responsible for the lack of formal standards. Id.
102
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interpretative statements of the statute and in its review of individual
complaints."' According to the Commission, candidates' access requests could be refused until the campaign began, at which time the
broadcaster was required to "give reasonable and good faith attention" to these demands." 2 The broadcaster had to consider each
request on an individualized basis and to respond in a manner which
3
accommodated, as much as possible, the candidate's stated needs."
Other factors, however, could be weighed, including: the amount of
time the candidate had previously received, whether the request
would significantly disrupt regular programming, and the possibility
of responsive demands for equal time under section 315(a)." 4 So long
as the broadcaster considered "the appropriate factors" and "act[ed]
reasonably and in good faith," its decision would be "entitled to
deference"" 5 even though the FCC might have reached a different
conclusion.'"' Having described the FCC's standards, the Court considered petitoners' contention that some of them were not in conform7
ity with the objectives of section 312(a)(7)."
The networks challenged the FCC's conclusion that it "[could]
independently determine whether a campaign had begun" as impermissibly involving the Commission in the electoral process and infringing upon the broadcasters' journalistic discretion." 8 The Court
found "that the Commission does not set the starting date for a
campaign," "" but rather decides after a complaint has been filed
whether the campaign is already underway.2 0 The FCC's determination is based on objective factors, including the networks' treatment
of the campaign.12 Consequently, the " 'determination of when the
statutory obligations attach does not control the electoral process,...
the determination is controlled by the process.' "122 Furthermore, the

II Id. at 2825. The Court maintained that the standard had "'evolved principally on a caseby-case basis," id., and that the criteria could be found in the Report on Enforcing Section
312(a)(7), supra note 37.
"'- 101 S. Ct. at 2825.
113Id. at 2825-26.
"I Id. The broadcaster may not invoke these considerations as pretexts, but "'must cite a
realistic danger" that granting access would result, for example, in significant program disruption. Id. at 2825. The FCC also required the broadcaster to state its reasons for denying access in
order to facilitate the Commission's review of its conduct. Id.
I's Id. at 2825-26.
16Id. at 2826.
117Id.
ItsId.
119Id.
120Id.
121Id.

122Id. (quoting CBS v. FCC, 629 F.2d 1, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
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FCC's approach narrowed the applicability of the provision "to the
period after a campaign commences," 23 thus avoiding an attachment
of section 312(a)(7) obligations as soon as the candidate is legally
qualified. 24 According to the Court, this construction limited the
potential deleterious effect of the provision on broadcasters and,
thereby, breathed "substance [into] its command of reasonable ac25
cess." 1
The networks also attacked the FCC's rule "that broadcasters
evaluate and respond to access requests on an individualized basis."12 8 They contended that the Commission's policy "attached inordinate significance to candidates' needs"'' 27 to the exclusion of their
own requirements and precluded the development of uniform policies
to deal with candidates' requests. The Supreme Court responded that
although broadcasters assessing the amount of time to be granted must
consider each candidate's specific request, there were other factors
that could be weighed. 128 Therefore, the Commission's standard simply "mandate[d] careful consideration . . not blind assent to" candidates' requests.129 Recognizing that the adoption of uniform policies
concerning access would be administratively desirable to the networks, the majority explicitly rejected such an approach because it
would ignore the candidates' "personal campaign strategies and the
exigencies of the political process."' 30 A uniform access approach,
reasoned the Court, amounted to an attempt by broadcasters to establish beforehand how much to give "all" candidates contrary to section
312(a)(7), which by its terms guarantees the candidate an "'individual" right of reasonable access.' 3' Concluding its analysis of the
FCC's construction of the reasonable access provision, the Court held
that the FCC's standards were not arbitrary and capricious, but were
reasonable and consistent with the purpose of the statute in allowing a
32
broadcaster some discretion yet requiring good faith.
Chief Justice Burger proceeded to determine whether the FCC
properly applied its standards in the present case. He began by ac123 id.

124Id.

12 Id. (emphasis in original).
120 Id.
127 Id.
'2

Id. See text accompanying note 117 supra.

129 101 S. Ct. at 2826.
130 Id. The majority observed that a blanket policy of granting only a particular segment of
time to candidates ignored campaign strategy and was unreasonable where the candidate desired
more or less time than was offered. Id.
13, Id. (emphasis in original).
13 Id. at 2827.
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knowledging that despite the informality of these standards,1 33 the
networks had adequate notice that their treatment of the Carter-

Mondale request would not be in conformity with them.134 Reviewing the Commission's decision-making process, he noted that its deci-

sion concerning the beginning of the presidential campaign was based
upon numerous factors which included formal announcements by
several Republican and Democratic candidates seeking the nomination, the impending Iowa caucus, and significant coverage by the
print media in the previous two months.135 "The Commission's con-

clusion about the status of the campaign,"' 136 therefore, was deemed
reasonable in light of its consideration of objective factors and its
37
consistency with previously announced policy. 1
The Chief Justice next focused on the Carter Committee's request. He found that since the request had been made almost two
months in advance, was not preceded by any prior requests for time,
and allowed flexibility for the date of the broadcast, 3 the networks'

articulated reasons for denying the access requests were" 'speculative
and unsubstantiated at best.' "9

Accordingly, Chief Justice Burger

held that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in deciding that
the networks' responses to the Carter request were deficient under
section 312(a)(7). 110 He mentioned, however, that although the
Court might have decided otherwise, its role was not to substitute its
judgment for the agency's.'14
"' Id. For discussion of the Court's position concerning the lack of formalized rules, see note
110 supra.
"' 101 S. Ct. at 2828. The Chief justice further observed that in spite of the networks'
knowledge of the FCC's section 312(a)(7) policy, they adopted blanket rules concerning access
requests and responded with either outright denials or offers of a predetermined amount of time.
Id. In contrast to the Court's position concerning notice, at least one commentator has asserted
that the FCC's reasonable access standard does not comport with due process requirements
because of inconsistencies in the FCC reports and orders. See Albert, The FCC Assumes a New
Role as Regulator of Broadcast Advertising and Candidates' Access, 54 ST. JOHN's L. RE,. 279,
318-21 (1980).
"'

101 S. Ct. at 2828.
I"
ld.
ld. The Court relied upon the FCC's statement that " 'a presidentialcampaign [might] be
I'

in full -swing almost a year before an election.' " Id. at 2827 (quoting Report on Enforcing
Section 312(a)(7), supra note 37, at 1091) (emphasis in original). Moreover, a prior FCC decision
indicated that the Commmission would ultimately be responsible for determining whether a
campaign had begun. Id. at 2828 (citing Anthony R. Martin-Trigona, 67 F.C.C.2d 743 (1978)).
IId. at 2828.
I"Id. (quoting Carter-Mondale Presidential Comm. v. ABC, 74 F.C.C.2d 657, 674 (1979),
aff'd sub nom. CBS v. FCC, 629 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1980), aff'd, 101 S. Ct. 2813 (1981)). The
networks contended that the possibility of numerous equal time requests and the disruptive
impact on programming justified their denial of the Carter-Mondale request. Id.
'I"

Id. at 2829.

141 Id.
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Having considered and rejected the networks' statutory and implementation arguments, the majority lastly considered whether the
FCC's implementation of section 312(a)(7) violated the networks' first
amendment rights by infringing upon their traditional journalistic
discretion.142 Recognizing that " '[the] role of the Government as an
'overseer' . . . of the public interest and the role of the licensee as a
journalistic 'free agent' call[ed] for a delicate balancing of competing
interests,' "'43 the Court disagreed with the networks' contention that
section 312(a)(7), as implemented, disrupted that balance.
The Court noted that a licensee has obligations to the public both
to share its frequencies and to contribute to the marketplace of
ideas.144 Comparing the first amendment rights of broadcasters with
those of candidates and the public, the majority stressed that " '[i]t is
the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters,
which is paramount.' ,,4-5 Recalling the importance of political
speech, to which first amendment rights are especially applicable, 1'"
the majority concluded that the Commission's implementation of the
statute enhanced free speech in the important realm of politics and
47
contributed to "the effective operation of the democratic process."
The Court, rejecting the notion of a general right of access, emphasized that the right to access under section 312(a)(7) is limited to
federal political candidates advancing their candidacies during the
actual campaign and does not infringe upon the broadcasters' discretion "to present their views on any issue or to carry any particular type
of programming."' 48 Thus, the Supreme Court held that the FCC's
interpretation and implementation of section 312(a)(7) struck an ac142

Id.

1 Id. (quoting DemocraticNat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 117).
'"

Id.

Id. (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390) (emphasis deleted).
I18 The political candidate has a particularly strong interest in exercising his free speech
Id.
rights. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52-53 (1975) (candidate has constitutional right to
145

"vigorously and tirelessly...

advocate his own election" and "have the unfettered opportunity
to make [his] views known"). At the same time, the public has a right to explore and challenge
the character and credentials of the candidate in order to make an intelligent choice on election
day. See id. at 53; cf. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971) (applying New York
Times public official rule to alleged libelous publication concerning political candidate). See
generally T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966) (interests of
different parties in free speech); A. MEI.LEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1948) (importance of political speech in self-governing society). For a discussion of
political speech's superior position to commercial speech in the hierarchy of protected speech, see
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 200-01 (Brennan, J.,dissenting) and Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 310-22 (1974) (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
"1 101 S. Ct. at 2830; see Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265. 272 (1971) (first
amendment particularly applicable to political campaigns).
1 8 101 S. Ct. at 2830.
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rights of federal
ceptable balance between "the First Amendment
49
candidates, the public and broadcasters." 1
Justice White, in his dissent, disagreed with the majority's position that the Supreme Court should affirm the FCC's construction of
section 312(a)(7) unless unreasonable, contending that such a stance
"conceal[ed] the fundamental issue"' 50 of the case. That issue was
whether Congress, by enacting the reasonable access provision, intended to "negate the longstanding statutory policy of deferring to
editorial judgments that [were] not destructive of the goals of the
[Communications] Act."' 5 ' The dissent suggested that the Commission would be required under that policy to accept broadcaster's
reasonable access decisions, even though it might have concluded
otherwise. 52 Instead, the majority permitted the Commission to
impose its view on the broadcasters' "different but nevertheless reasonable" access decisions. 5 3 The dissent maintained that this was
tantamount to "administratively creat[ing] a right of access" which
was not intended by Congress. 154
Examining the statutory language, Justice White found no support for the Commission's interpretation of the provision.' 55 Reasonable access and reasonable time were deemed to be "matters about
which fair minds could easily differ."'' 56 Despite the Commission's
recognition that neither the statute nor the legislative history explained the scope of the provision, he observed that it conferred upon
itself "carte blanche" the duty of defining and implementing the
provision.' 5 7 The Justice maintained that such an action was arbitrary, capricious, or at best "'a clear error in judgment." ' 58
In Justice White's view, the Commission approached the CarterMondale case as if section 312(a)(7) had been enacted in a vacuum.' 59 The FCC ignored specific provisions and their interpreta149

Id.

'5 Id. at 2830 (White, J., dissenting). Justices Rehnquist and Stevens joined in the dissent.
'5' Id. The dissent argued that the FCC's "exercise of wide discretion in interpreting and
enforcing" section 312(a)(7) itself amounted to an abridgment of broadcasters' editorial discretion. Id. at 2836 (White, J., dissenting).
,12 Id. at 2830 (White, J., dissenting); see NBC v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1118 (1974), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976) (scope of agency review to exclude broadcaster determinations
which agency would simply have decided differently and include only those determinations
made unreasonably and in bad faith).
5 101 S. Ct. at 2830 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White found it "untenable to suggest that
the right of access the Commission . . . created [was] required or even suggested by the plain
language of this section." Id. at 2831 (White, J., dissenting).
'. Id. at 2830-31 (White, J., dissenting).
'55

Id.

15

Id.

15-

Id.

Id. (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)).
,I Id. at 2831 (White, J., dissenting).
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tions which preserved broadcasters' journalistic discretion.' 60 It also
ignored settled "statutory policies concerning access," specifically the
public interest duty to present information about political candidates
and their campaigns.' 6' The Justice noted that in regulating the
media, Congress has struggled to balance "the need to allocate scarce
frequencies" 1 62 against the need to preserve broad journalistic discretion "in the use of those frequencies."'163 Consequently, although
broadcasters have been statutorily obligated to operate their stations
in the public interest, they have been given a great deal of leeway in
determining how to fulfill their public interest obligations.' 6
Further, the pre-existing statutory duty to present political programming
under the public interest doctrine did not provide a candidate with an
individual claim of right to broadcast time, though failure to grant
6
any access would have clearly contravened congressional intent.'
Therefore, according to the dissent, the Communications Act and its
prior judicial construction reflected the long-standing policy of preservation of the editorial discretion of broadcasters which was "so
obviously grounded in constitutional considerations that in the absence of unequivocal legislative intent to the contrary"' 6 the Commission's creation of access rights under section 312(a)(7) should not be
approved.
In contrast to the majority, the dissent found no support for the
creation of an affirmative right of access in the legislative history of
section 312(a)(7).' 6 7 Justice White maintained, instead, that the pro-

vision codified the broadcaster's pre-existing duty under the public
interest standard.168 Tracing the history of the enactment of section
312(a)(7), he found that all of the bills were described in Congress
either as a codification of the public interest standard or as a clarification of a licensee's obligation to provide federal candidates with
broadcast time under that standard.' 9 The dissenting justice then
'- Id. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976) specifically states that broadcasters are not common carriers,
while id.§ 326 forbids the FCC to censor radio transmissions. 101 S. Ct. at 2832 (White, J.,
dissenting) (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 153(h), 326 (1976)). Together, these provisions evidenced the
legislature's intent to preserve broad powers of journalistic discretion in the licensee. Id. at 2823
(White, J., dissenting). The dissent further noted that section 153(h) had been used to invalidate
an FCC attempt to require cablecasters to devote certain of their channels to public use. Id.
(citing FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979)).
161 101 S.Ct. at 2831 (White, J., dissenting).
162

Id.

163 Id.
184

Id. at 2831-32 (White, J., dissenting).

Id. at 2832-33 (White, J., dissenting); see note 38 supra.
101 S. Ct. at 2833 (White, J., dissenting).
1, Id. at 2834 (White, J.,dissenting).
165

'

168 Id.

189 Id. at 2833-34 (White,

J.,

dissenting).
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focused on the bill eventually enacted as the Campaign Communications Reform Act.170 He asserted that Congress had included section

312(a)(7) because several other provisions of the bill, such as the
proposed repeal of the equal time provision for presidential elections,1 7 ' the requirement that networks charge federal candidates a
favorable rate prior to elections,17 2 and a limitation on campaign
expenditures, 7 3 might have discouraged broadcasters from granting
candidates access. 74 Thus, a reasonable access provision was neces-

sary because it emphasized the inherent public interest obligation to
provide federal candidates with broadcast time, 1 5 and "insured that
other provisions of the bill would not dilute the pre-existing public
interest standard as applied to federal elections."'' 76 Justice White
also noted that although increasing the candidates' opportunities to
receive broadcast time was an objective of the Act, that purpose was
77
never specifically attached to section 312(a)(7).1

Examining the conforming amendment to section 315(a),'

78

the

dissent pointed out that the original provision was made misleading
during codification when the word "hereby" was inadvertently omit-

ted.

79

Prior to its amendment, section 315(a) could have been read

I7'(construing S. 382, s-upra note 74).
/d.
Id. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting). When introduced to Congress, S. 382, supra note 74,
contained a provision exempting presidential and vice-presidential candidates from coverage
under the equal time provision. SENATE REPom-, supra note 72, at 38. During floor debates
members of the House resolved that the equal time provision had "served us well," 117 CONG.
REC. 43,169 (1971) (remark of Rep. MacDonald), and was "one of the very fundamental things
upon which the whole electoral process in this country depend[ed].'" Id. at 43,170 (remark of
Rep. Springer). Therefore, the proposed partial repeal was rejected in the House. H. R. REP. No.
752, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1971).
17'101 S. Ct. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting). This requirement was encated into law and is
currently codified at 47 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1976).
1 101 S. Ct. at 2834 (White, J.,dissenting). Although enacted as part of the Campaign
Reform Act, the provision placing a ceiling on campaign expenditures was subsequently repealed. Act of Oct. 15, 1974, Pub. L. No. 94-443, 88 Stat. 1278 (1974).
"'
101 S. Ct. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting).
"' Id.: sWe SENATE REPorr, supra note 72, at 28.
101 S. Ct. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent recognized that section 312(a)(7)
altered existing law by 'putt[ing] teeth in the obligation" to operate in the public interest by
providing a sanction for non-compliance. Id.
...Id. The dissenting justice suggested that other provisions of the Act would have the effect
of increasing candidate access, for example, the provision which required broadcasters to sell
political time at a favorable rate. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1976)).
114Id. at 2835 (White, J., dissenting); see notes 98-100 supra and accompanying text for a
discussion of the majority's view on the conforming amendment.
" 101 S. Ct. at 2835 (White, J., dissenting). Prior to amendment, section 3 15(a) read "no
obligation is imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate." 47
U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970) (amended 1976). Had the provision been codified as enacted it would
have read "No obligation is hereby imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by
any such candidate." 101 S.Ct. at 2835 (White, J., dissenting). For the current language of this
provision, see note 99 supra.
"'
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to mean that broadcasters had no duty to permit candidates to use
their stations. 180 The conforming amendment returned the provision
to its original form and clarified the licensee's public interest duty to
give candidates reasonable access.'
Justice White refused, however,
to find that the conforming amendment was significant or that the
legislative history supported the Commission's construction of the
provision since it "drastically limit[ed] the discretion of the broadcast82
ers and .. .radically expand[ed] its own oversight authority."1

Suggesting that the most important issue in the case was the
proper scope of the FCC's review of "broadcaster editorial judgments,"' 8 3 Justice White maintained that the amount of deference due
the FCC's interpretation of section 312(a)(7) depended in part upon
its consistency with prior interpretations and its persuasiveness. 84 The
5
FCC, he asserted, had acted "quite inconsistent[ly]" in this area.18
For example, the FCC's interpretation at the time of the enactment of
the provision differed significantly from its present construction. 18 6
The early policy of deference to broadcasters' reasonable and good
faith access determinations has been replaced by inordinate emphasis
upon the candidate's individual needs. 87 The dissenting Justice,
therefore, found the Commission's departure from its prior practice to
88
be in error.
Justice White then identified four particular problems in the
Commission's decision that underscored its fundamental lack of persuasiveness. 189 The first problem was the FCC's contradictory suggestions that, on one hand, it would respect broadcaster discretion con180101 S. Ct. at 2835 (White, J.,dissenting).
191 Id.
182Id.

183Id. at 2837 (White, J., dissenting).
I" Id. at 2835 (White, J.,dissenting). Additionally, the deference which must be given to an
agency's construction " 'depend[s] on the thoroughness evident in its gonsideration, the validity
of its reasoning, .. .and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control.'" Id. (quoting Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 101 S. Ct. 2142,
2148 n.13 (1981)).
185 Id. at 2835 (White, J.,dissenting).
188 Id. at 2835-36 (White, J.,dissenting).
187 Id. The dissent relied primarily on the FCC's Report on Use of Facilities, supra note 38, to
support its position. See 101 S.Ct. at 2835 (White, J.,dissenting). This report indicated that the
FCC would invoke a test of reasonableness to evaluate broadcaster responses to section 312(a)(7)
requests. Id. at 2836 (White, J., dissenting). Under this test the FCC required broadcasters to
operate in good faith, but would not substitute its judgment for that of the broadcasters'. Id.
Moreover, this policy of deference had been consistently advocated prior to the Carter-Mondale
case. Id. at 2836-37 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent observed that the FCC had previously
allowed the licensee to make access determinations at its own discretion, not according to the
needs of the candidate. Id. at 2837 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Report on Enforcing Section
312(a)(7), supra note 37, at 1091).
1" 101 S. Ct. at 2837 (White, J.,dissenting).
188 Id. at 2837-39 (White, J.,dissenting).
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cerning access, while, on the other hand, it would exercise broad

discretion in interpreting and implementing the provision. 9 0 The
second problem was that the granting of access on an individualized
basis under section 312(a)(7) was in conflict with the mandate "of

[section] 315(a) that all candidates be treated equally." 19 ' The third
was "the stringent degree of oversight" which the Commission chose

to exercise over broadcaster access determinations.19 2 The fourth and
last problem was that despite the majority's contention that the FCC
would respect broadcaster's good faith determinations if they were
based on the appropriate factors, such deference was meaningless
93

since the factors themselves "eviscerate[d] broadcaster discretion." 1

Accordingly, the dissenting Justice found the Commission's current

radical view not only quite94inconsistent with its prior views but also
"singularly unpersuasive."1
Justice White completed his analysis of the networks' responses to
the Carter-Mondale Committee by reviewing their reasons for denying the request. He found that although none were "patently unrea-

sonable,"''9

5

they could only be considered unreasonable if viewed

from the perspective of the majority and the FCC, whose "overarch-

ing focus [was] directed to the perceived needs of the individual
"9 Id. at 2837-38 (White, J., dissenting). More specifically, the dissenting Justice argued that
the FCC's determination that it would decide when section 312(a)(7) rights have attached
transformed the timing question from one within the realm of broadcaster discretion "into a
question of law to be determined by the Commission de novo." Id. at 2837 (White, J.,dissenting). Reasonable minds could differ on the date of campaign commencement; and the FCC had
previously refused to make such a determination. Id. at 2837-38 (White, J., dissenting). Thus,
the Commission exceeded its authority by imposing its time determination on broadcasters
instead of honoring their reasonable determinations. Id. at 2838 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. Justice White reasoned that if a broadcaster granted a candidate time based on his
''
personal needs, section 315(a) would be triggered, thereby requiring equal treatment of his
competitors, at least where the competitor would be receiving less time under an individualized
approach than the first candidate. Id. The dissenting Justice found that the Commission's
"rejection of [an] equality approach" as a method of complying with the reasonable access
standard permitted the inference that "reasonable access may require unequal access," and thus
was plain error. Id.
I Id. Although the Commission suggested that factors besides the candidate's individual
needs can be considered in granting access, id, the dissent argued that given "the stringent degree
of oversight" which the FCC has chosen to exercise, those factors can be given "limited, if any,
weight" by broadcasters. Id. at 2839 (White, J., dissenting). For example, in the present case the
broadcasters were permitted to consider that over one hundred individuals had notified the FCC
of their candidacies, yet the FCC determined it was unlikely that a significant portion of the
candidates would request time. Id. at 2838 (White, J., dissenting). The result of such a determination is that the broadcaster must demonstrate "to a near certainty" that other candidates will
make responsive requests for time to justify its consideration of the factor. Id. at 2839 (White, J.,
dissenting).
193Id.
Id. at 2837 (White, J., dissenting).
I01
1I5Id. at 2840 (White, J., dissenting).
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candidate."196 Thus, instead of permitting broadcasters to determine
the amount of time a candidate should be given, the majority opinion
established a "unilateral right of candidates to demand and receive
any 'reasonable' amount of time a candidate determin[ed] to be necessary to execute a particular campaign strategy."' 9 7 Justice White
concluded that the proper approach to access requests would be for
the Commission to "intervene in only the most egregious of circumstances," when, for example, broadcasters disregard the public interest and refuse to afford candidates any time. 98
The Supreme Court in CBS v. FCC held that section 312(a)(7)
provided federal candidates with an affirmative right of access 9 9 and
that each request for time should be evaluated on an individualized
basis.200 The majority implicitly found that broadcasters could evaluate and respond to section 312(a)(7) requests on an individualized
basis, while complying with their statutory duties under section
315(a). 20 ' The dissent, on the other hand, maintained that ascertaining a reasonable time under the majority's individualized approach
"may require unequal access," in spite of section 315 which "requires
202
°
equal time for all once it is granted to anyone.
Congress clearly intended section 315 to remain operative notwithstanding the enactment of section 312(a)(7).203 Therefore, it
must be assumed that the Court considered its interpretation of the
reasonable access provision to be reconcilable with the equal time

198 Id.

1I7 Id.
198 Id. n.4 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, while joining Justice White's dissenting
opinion, wrote seperately to illuminate additional problems with the majority opinion. Id. at
2841 (Stevens, J., dissenting). First, the Justice asserted that a broadcaster's performance should
not be judged on the basis of one denial of access. Instead, the reasonableness of the broadcaster's
conduct should be made "in the context of [the] entire political campaign." Id. Second, Justice
Stevens noted "[the] impermissible risk that the Commission's evaluation of a given refusal by a
licensee will be biased" because of the political nature of the Commission. Id. See note 11 supra.

1,9 101 S. Ct. at 2824-25.

Id. at 2825-26; see text accompanying notes 113-14 supra.
'a' The Court recognized the continuing viability of section 315(a) by permitting broadcasters
to consider potential equal time requests in evaluating applications for time under section
312(a)(7); see 101 S. Ct. at 2825; text accompanying note 114 supra.
20, 101 S. Ct. at 2838 (White, J., dissenting); see note 191 supra.
20' When Congress enacted the Federal Election Campaign Act in an effort to give candidates
increased and less expensive access to the broadcast media, it considered and rejected a partial
repeal of the equal time provision. See note 171 supra. The provision was originally enacted as
part of the Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 44 Stat. 1162. Although amended twice by the Act of
Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, 73 Stat. 557, and the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 103(a)(1), 86 Stat. 4 (1972), its mandate concerning the sale of
political time remains the same.
2
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provision, though it did not attempt to reconcile them.2 0 4 As long as
reasonable time is made equally available to the federal candidates,
then by the terms of the two provisions they operate in harmony.20 5
The CBS v. FCC holding, however, added a gloss to the language of
section 312(a)(7) by requiring reasonableness to be assessed in terms of
the individual candidate. In light of the Court's interpretation, compliance with both provisions can in practice occur in one situation. If
all candidates have identical needs and campaign strategies, and either request and receive the desired amount of time under section
312(a)(7), or demand equal time under section 315 after an opponent
has received the desired time, then each candidate has received his
"reasonable" amount of time, that amount being equal to the reasonable amount received by his opponents. Realistically, however, candidates will differ in their needs and campaign strategies; hence, the
conflict between section 312(a)(7) and section 315(a) will invariably
arise. For example, the first candidate may request one hour of television advertising and the second may request two hours. If each is
granted their respective requests, then section 312(a)(7)'s individualized need criterion is satisfied, but section 315(a)'s mandate of equality is not.
Two solutions to this conflict will be advanced. The first utilizes
the majority's individualized need approach to section 312(a)(7). The
second proposes a different test based upon a settled theory, the public
interest doctrine.
In his dissent, Justice White perceptively recognized the reasonable access-equal time overlap, and argued that if the networks had
affirmatively granted the Carter-Mondale request, "[section] 315
would require that equal time be extended to all other Democratic
candidates and would forbid any kind of individualized consideration
that would result in giving them less time than had been previously
given to their competitor."2 0 8 He did not address, however, the
As a general rule "statutes are to be interpreted... to give operation to all their parts and

to maintain them in a harmonious working relationship." Kennedy for President Comm. v.
FCC, 636 F.2d 432, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The statutes referred to in the Kennedy case were
sections 312(a)(7) and 315(a). The Kennedy Campaign Committee alleged a violation of section
312(a)(7) based upon the television networks' refusals to give Senator Kennedy, as a presidential
candidate, free time to address the public. It was argued that the Senator was entitled to the time
in order to respond to speeches concerning the economy which had been made by President
Carter. The court found no violation of section 312(a)(7) for refusing to provide free time and
furthermore held that section 312(a)(7) could not be used to circumvent section 315(a) which
specifically excluded such speeches from the protective scope of the equal time provision. Id. In
this regard the court stated that "'[n]oprovision may be misused to defeat the effective functioning of another." Id.
"' Compare the language of section 312(a)(7), at text accompanying note 10 supra, with the
language of section 315(a), at note 5 supra.
2' 101 S. Ct. at 2838 (white, J., dissenting).
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question of how much time a candidate should receive if under the
reasonable time calculus he is entitled to more time than his opponent
received. Conspicuously absent from the majority opinion is any discussion of the overlap. Yet, it seems clear that under the majority's
interpretation of section 312(a)(7), a candidate would receive the
amount of time due him regardless of whether that amount is greater
or less than the amount of time his opponent received.
Justice White's reasoning can be viewed as dividing the statutory
overlap into three situations. Initially, it must be noted that once a
candidate has been granted reasonable access, his opponent who subsequently requests time could receive less, more, or the same amount
of time as the first candidate. In addition, the amount of time received
207
by the first candidate viould delimit the time under section 315(a).
Accordingly, three overlap situations emerge: one, where a candidate
receives less time under an individualized approach than he would
under the equal time provision; two, where a candidate receives more
time under an individualized approach than under section 315; and,
three, where a candidate receives the same amount of time under
section 312(a) (7) as under section 315(a). Using these three categories
of overlap with an eye toward furthering the policies of both the
reasonable access and equal time provisions, a method for resolving
the overlap which would permit compliance with both provisions can
be fashioned.
The underlying premise of this method is that all access requests
be evaluated initially under the Court's individualized need approach
to section 312(a)(7). After the first candidate is granted access, a
subsequent candidate's access request will be reevaluated in light of
the amount of time the candidate would receive under the equal time
provision. Obviously, the amount would be equal to what the first
candidate received. If a candidate would receive less time under the
individualized need approach than under the equal time provision,
section 315(a) would operate to the exclusion of section 312(a)(7) and
would ensure that the candidate receives the same amount of time as
his opponent.20 8
Conversely, if a candidate would be entitled to more time under
the individualized need approach than under the equal time provision, section 312(a)(7) would operate notwithstanding section 315(a)
to allow the candidate to obtain the greater amount of time.209 This
result can be justified because it is consistent with the majority's
See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
This is the approach set forth by Justice White in his dissent. See note 191 supra.
"" This approach is consistent with the Court's view that access should be granted based on
the individual's need regardless of the amount of time received by the opponent.
20

208
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interpretation, and, more importantly, because it furthers section
312(a)(7)'s purpose of increasing candidate's access to the media. Unfortunately, without more, such a result is in direct conflict with the
mandate of section 315(a). Thus, a caveat should be noted. Arguably,
a candidate who previously was granted access could make another
312(a)(7) request to receive the same amount of time as the present
candidate..2 10 Subsequent candidates would be measured against the
one who was granted the greater amount of time for equal time
purposes.
Undoubtedly, the source of the section 312(a)(7)-section 315(a)
overlap is the CBS v. FCC individualized need analysis. If a suitable
alternative were found, the resulting conflict could be resolved. The
public interest standard can provide such a solution.21' Defining
reasonable time in terms of the public interest would give meaning to
the term "reasonable" in section 312(a) (7), yet at the same time permit
broadcasters to comply with section 315(a). Under this approach, a
broadcaster would evaluate the importance of a particular election
and the public's interest in it to determine how much time to devote to
the entire campaign; then, the broadcaster would offer the allotted
time to the candidates in equal shares. Although reading the public
interest standard into the command of "reasonable time" may be
interpreted as merely a reiteration of the broadcasters' duty under
that general doctrine, the obligation imposed exceeds the one that
previously existed. Under the proposed approach, broadcasters would
be prohibited from making the threshold inquiry of whether a federal
race is important enough to merit candidate access to the media. They
would be permitted to invoke the public interest standard only in
212
determining what constitutes reasonable time.
There is no evidence that Congress intended section 312(a)(7) to
be a de facto amendment of section 315(a).2 13 Yet, the Supreme
" It should be noted that the FCC has commented upon the interplay between sections
312(a)(7) and 315, taking the position that candidates who have previously received reasonable
time may be barred from making demands for equal time subsequent to an opponent's receipt of
time. See Carter-Mondale Presidential Comm. v. ABC, 74 F.C.C.2d 631, 648 n.29, af'd on
rehearing, 74 F.C.C.2d 657 (1979), aff'd sub noma. CBS v. FCC, 629 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1980),

afJ'd, 101 S. Ct. 2813 (1981).
' For a discussion of the public interest doctrine, see note 38 supra.
,it An approach of this nature would guarantee federal candidates access to the broadcast
media and assure that the overall public interest is served. Ironically, the first bill introduced by
the Senate dealing with campaign reform contained terms which balanced the candidates'

interests against the public interest. The bill, S. 3637, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), provided "that
consistent with the other needs of the community, broadcast licensees shall make a reasonable
amount of time available for legally qualified candidates for federal elective offices." 116 CONG.

REc. 11,593 (1970) (emphasis added).
113See note 171 supra.
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Court's individualized need approach necessarily subrogates the equal
time provision to the reasonable access provision. Once some candidates have been granted different amounts of time under the individualized need approach, a competitor who invokes the equal time provision in an attempt to equalize treatment will find section 315(a) of no
avail. If the first candidate to invoke section 312(a) (7) makes a responsive demand for equal time after his opponent is granted access, 21 he,
will receive it. This equal time grant, however, will not result in all
competitors receiving the same amount of time. Thus, the equal time
provision operates as a tool to procure more time without achieving
the desired result of equalizing candidate treatment.
If Congress remains committed to the underlying purpose of the
equal time provision,21 5 then additional legislation is necessary to
clarify how that provision will operate in conjunction with the reasonable time provision. One legislative solution is to make the operation
of section 315(a) dependent upon the amount of time originally obtained under section 312(a)(7). When a candidate could receive less
time under an individualized approach than his opponent, the equal
time provision should operate automatically. For subsequent equal
time requests, section 315(a) should only operate to give a candidate
the difference in time between any amount previously received and
the greater amount received by his opponent.
Section 312(a)(7) created a reasonable right of access for federal
candidates, but the Court's interpretation of the provision in CBS v.
FCC impairs the right of candidates to obtain equal broadcast time
under section 315(a). Unless Congress clarifies the equal time rights of
candidates and makes them a corollary of the reasonable time rights,
the exercise of section 312(a)(7) rights will result in unequal access for
federal political candidates.
M. Melinda Rainey
914 For the FCC's approach to equal time demands made by the candidates who have
previously obtained acces under section 312(a)(7), see note 210 supra.
21S See note 40 supra.

